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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On July 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished memorandum decision, 
2004 UT App 228 (2004 WL 1534204), affirming dismissal of plaintiftfappellant 
Machelle Canfield's ("Ms. Canfield") appeal from the trial court's ruling granting 
appellee/defendant Layton City's (the "City") Rule 26(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Canfield petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, 
and her petition was granted as to one issue only. Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Does Ms. Canfield's Complaint state a sufficient claim for the 
existence of, and violation of, a contract with the City that is not subject to the immunity 
and notice and claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1, et. seq (the "Act")? 
Standard of Review: "Compliance with the [Governmental] Immunity 
Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims 
against governmental entities." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, % 9, 40 P.3d 632 
(citations omitted). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8, 31 P.3d 1147; 
Housing Auth. of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 10, 44 P.3d 724. On 
certiorari, this Court gives no deference to the Court of Appeals' conclusions of law. See, 
e.g., Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). 
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Preservation of Issue: Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time, including on or after appeal. Horn v. Utah Dep 't of Pub. Safety, 962 
P.2d 95, 99 (Utah 1998); Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11,44 P.3d 724; Nielsen v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was preserved in the City's motion to 
dismiss and supporting memorandum, in Ms. Canfield's opposition to that motion, and in 
the trial court's Order granting the City's motion. See R. 6-8, 9-24,25-27, 28-52, 53-54. 
2. Issue: Do Utah courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Canfield's 
claims due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies as set forth in applicable City 
policies and procedures and based on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106? 
Standard of Review: Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law. Beaver County, 2001 UT 81, % 8, 31 P.3d 1147; Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 
f 10,44 P.3d 724. 
Preservation of Issue: Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time, including on or after appeal. Horn, 962 P.2d at 99; Snyder, 2002 UT 
28, f 11, 44 P.3d 724; Nielsen, 888 P.2d at 134. 
3. Issue: Is any appeal in this case rendered futile because this lawsuit is 
subject to dismissal on grounds of res judicata, inasmuch as substantially the same 
complaint was previously dismissed by the federal court in Canfield v. Layton City, Case 
No. 1:02CV41 (N.D. Utah), based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the court's 
order to amend her complaint, which dismissal is an adjudication on the merits pursuant 
toFed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b)? 
Standard of Review: Whether claims are barred by res judicata is a 
question of law. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 20, 70 P.3d 1. 
Preservation of Issue: Ms. Canfield raised the issue of res judicata in her 
memorandum in opposition to the City's motion to dismiss, by referring to the federal 
court's dismissal of the same Complaint that was subsequently filed in this lawsuit. See 
R. 28-35, at R. 30-31. Before the City could file a reply, the trial court granted the City's 
motion. The City also would have raised res judicata as an affirmative defense in its 
Answer. Regardless, an appellate court can affirm on any grounds, even one not relied 
upon by the trial court. Hall v. Utah State Dep 't of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 21, 24 
P.3d 958 (citations omitted). Documents relied on by the City for its res judicata defense 
are part of the public record arid subject to judicial notice.1 These public records are 
included for the Court's convenience in the Addendum to this brief. 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules and statutes are determinative: 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under the color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the 
entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2). (Governmental Immunity Act). 
]A court may take judicial notice of public records and court filings in other cases. 
Moore's Federal Practice ^ |12.34[2]. Such records "[are] not viewed as scrutiny of 
evidence . . . since facts capable of judicial notice are recorded in sources whose accuracy 
is not subject to reasonable question." Id. 1f56.30[3][c]. Thus, even in Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public records outside 
the pleadings without converting the 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. Id. 
U 56.30[4]. Accord, GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 
1384 (10th Cir. 1997). 
% 
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems 
best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct and 
business of the municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. (Utah Municipal Code; Rules and Regulations for 
Administration of Municipality). 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for 
improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an 
adjudication on the merits. 
Fed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 Appeals of Terminations (copy of relevant statute 
attached in Addendum to this brief as Ex. 14) 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Canfield's appeal arises from a lawsuit that she filed in state court on or about 
November 25,2002, Case No. 020700620. The history of Ms. Canfield's claims is more 
extensive, however, and includes a November 18, 2002 dismissal by the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Utah, of essentially the same Complaint that 
she subsequently filed in state court. 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following allegations are taken from Ms. Canfield's Complaint: 
Ms. Canfield was employed by Layton City as a police dispatcher for 
approximately fourteen years prior to her resignation in 2002. R. 1-5. She contends that 
she resigned her employment on June 2, 2001 because "officers, employees, agents or 
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servants of [Layton City] confronted [her] with the allegation that [she] had misused sick 
leave." R. 9; see also R. 21 (Ms. Canfield's resignation letter). Her Complaint alleges 
that a new supervisor in the dispatch area where she worked "unfairly and unjustly 
scrutinized [her] work performance" and her use of sick leave, and that she felt the 
supervisor's request that she provide medical documentation of the need for sick leave 
was "an improper deviation from existing City policy." R. 2-3. She contends that she 
resigned because she was confronted with the "ultimatum" of either resigning or facing 
termination, and because she feared that "a termination would preclude her from gaining 
future gainful employment." R. 4. 
Ms. Canfield alleges that: (1) other employees "have not been punished as severely 
as she has, have not been terminated, or not given an ultimatum, but instead, were given 
employee warnings, probation, and other punishment," (2) that her alleged punishment, 
including her alleged termination, "was disproportionate to the acts alleged," and (3) that 
she "has been treated differently from and more severely than other employees of 
Defendant, all in contravention of Defendant's specific written policy." R. 4-5. She also 
alleges that "Defendant's personnel policy specifically requires that plaintiff be treated 
fairly and that any punishments or discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense 
alleged." Her Complaint asks for "damages in an amount to be proven at trial." R. 5. 
B. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND PRIOR 
DISPOSITION 
1. Federal Lawsuit 
On or about March 18, 2002, Ms. Canfield filed an Amended Complaint in the 
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County. See Canfield v. Layton City (Case No. 
020800412), attached in Aplee Add., as Ex. 1. The Amended Complaint is word for word 
identical to the Complaint filed herein, except that the Complaint here has added % 12.2 
Compare id. with Aplt Add., Ex. B. 
Layton City removed this initial state lawsuit to federal court and filed an Answer. 
See Answer, Case No. 1:02CV00041 (N.D. Utah), attached in Aplee Add., as Ex. 2. The 
basis for removal was the City's belief that the Amended Complaint asserted an equal 
protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which the federal court would have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Notice of Removal, Aplee Add., Ex. 3. 
Ms. Canfield did not object to removal. 
At a subsequent scheduling conference, United States Magistrate Judge Ronald N. 
Boyce commented that it was unclear what claim Ms. Canfield was asserting. Ms. 
Canfield's attorney then stated that there was no equal protection claim, and that Ms. 
Canfield was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under City policies. See Def s Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Req. Am. Compl. (Aug. 26, 2002), Aplee Add., Ex. 4. 
Based on Magistrate Judge Boyce's comment, on August 22, 2002, District Judge 
Dale Kimball, who was presiding over the federal lawsuit, issued an Order to Show Cause 
which stated: 
2This added ^ J12 states as follows: "Prior to these incidents, in December, 2000, 
after being Plaintiffs supervisor for only a few weeks, Lisa Murdock demanded that 
Plaintiff provide medical documentation of sick leave used at that time. Plaintiff did not 
provide said documentation, although she had it, because she felt that it was an improper 
deviation from existing City policy." The City submits that this additional allegation does 
not materially alter the substance or gravamen of her Complaint here from Ms. Canfield's 
Amended Complaint in the federal lawsuit. 
fi 
The above-entitled matter was removed from state court on defendant's 
contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
plaintiff did not allege such a claim and at pretrial before the magistrate 
judge plaintiffs counsel asserted there was no equal protection claim being 
pursued. Therefore, the case involves only state issues of violation of 
plaintiffs rights under Layton City's civil service standards. 
See Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 5. Judge Kimball ordered the parties to show 
cause on or before September 28,2002, why the lawsuit should not be remanded to state 
court. See id 
On August 26, 2002, the City filed a motion to require Ms. Canfield to file an 
amended complaint that specifically identified any cause of action which she was 
asserting. See Defs' Mot. Req. Am. Compl. (Aug. 26, 2002), Aplee Add., Ex. 6. Ms. 
Canfield never responded to the City's motion and she did not file any amended 
complaint clarifying the nature of her claims against the City. Instead, on September 20, 
2002, her attorney sent a letter to the City's attorneys providing them with a "more 
definitive statement as to what my client's claims are." See Letter from Brad Smith to 
Camille N. Johnson, attached as Ex. B to Defs' Resp. to Order to Show Cause, Aplee 
Add., Ex. 7. Ms. Canfield's counsel's letter states that she is not asserting an equal 
protection claim, and that her claim "is one for constructive termination on the basis that 
Layton City failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her 
job without due process of law," and states this would "implicate Federal Fourteenth 
Amendment case law." Id. 
On September 25, 2002, the City filed a response to the Order to Show Cause, and 
attached a copy of Mr. Smith's September 20, 2002 letter. See Defs' Resp. to Order 
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to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 7. The City's response cited to Mr. Smith's attached 
letter and notified the court that "plaintiffs attorney has identified his client's claim as 
one for deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." See id., p. 4. Based on this letter, the City asked the federal court to retain 
jurisdiction of the lawsuit and to grant the City's motion requiring Ms. Canfield to amend 
her complaint. Id. 
Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's Order to Show Cause, 
and never responded or objected to the City's statement to the court that Ms. Canfield had 
informed the City that her claim was a due process claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Ms. Canfield also failed to respond to the City's motion that she amend her 
complaint. On October 1, 2002, the federal court granted the City's motion requiring Ms. 
Canfield to amend her complaint, and ordered her to do so within 30 days. See Order, 
Aplee Add., Ex. 8. 
Ms. Canfield did not file a second amended complaint as required by the federal 
court's October 1,2002 Order. Accordingly, on November 15, 2003, the City filed a 
motion to dismiss based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the court's Order. See 
Motion to Dismiss & Supp. Mem, Aplee Add., Ex. 9. On November 18, 2002, Judge 
Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit due to her failure to comply with the court's 
Order. Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 10. 
2. Subsequent State Lawsuit 
On November 25,2002, one week after Judge Kimball dismissed her federal court 
lawsuit, Ms. Canfield filed her Complaint in this lawsuit. As discussed above, her 
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Complaint here was virtually identical to the Amended Complaint that had been 
dismissed by Judge Kimball. 
The City did not answer the Complaint and, on December 23, 2002, filed a Motion 
to Dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), based on lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and grounded in Ms. Canfield's failure to file a Notice of Claim. R. 6-7, 9-
24. On January 17, 2003, Ms. Canfield filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, where 
she admitted that she had not filed a Notice of Claim ®. 30), and contended that her 
"complaint alleges a constructive termination and violation of Layton City's written 
employment rules including rules regarding the proportionality of employee discipline, 
rules relating to consistency among termination, and related matters" ®. 31). She argued 
that her Complaint "sounds in contract."3 R. 31. She further contended that her 
employment with the City had "a reasonable expectation of its continuance" and that 
"[t]here were various policies and procedures in place for termination and discipline."4 R. 
32. She cited to the federal lawsuit and incorrectly asserted that the federal lawsuit was 
dismissed "on the basis that there was no federal jurisdiction." R. 30-31. 
When responding to the City's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, Ms. 
Canfield did not provide the trial court with a copy of any policies and procedures on 
3This assertion is, of course, contrary to Ms. Canfield's attorney's prior 
representation that his client's complaint claim asserted a Fourteenth Amendment due 
process claim. See Ex. B to Aplee Add., Ex. 7. 
4Ms. Canfield stated in her response that her "prayer for relief includes a prayer for 
contract damages with no reference to tort type damages whatsoever." R. 33. In reality, 
Ms. Canfield's signed and notarized response to the City's interrogatories in the federal 
lawsuit state that she is seeking "general damages for suffering and humiliation," which 
are tort damages, not contract damages. See PL's Resp. to Def s Interrog. No. 3, attached 
as Ex. 11 in Aplee Add. 
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which she relied for her assertion that her claims sounded in "contract," nor did she cite to 
specific City policies or procedures which she claims were breached.5 
The City had no opportunity to file a reply memorandum in support of its Motion 
to Dismiss because, prior to the due date, the state trial court contacted the City's 
attorneys and informed them that the court would grant the City's Motion. On 
February 19, 2003, the state trial court filed its Order granting the City's Motion to 
Dismiss. R. 53-54. On March 12,2003, Ms. Canfield filed a notice of appeal ®. 56). 
On July 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished memorandum decision, 
2004 UT App 228 (2004 WL 1534204), affirming dismissal of Ms. Canfield's appeal 
from the trial court's ruling granting the City's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. She subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. Her 
petition was granted as to one issue. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' denial of Ms. Canfield's appeal for 
the following reasons. 
First, Ms. Canfield's Complaint fails on its face to identify any contract or 
contractual obligation with the City, and it also fails to allege a breach of any contract by 
the City. At best, the Complaint alleges only that Ms. Canfield believes that she was 
treated unfairly and differently from other employees, in contravention of the City's 
policy. R. 2-5. The words "contract" and "breach" never even appear in Ms. Canfield's 
5Attaching evidence to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion does not convert the motion into 
one for summary judgment. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, f 5, 987 P.2d 36. 
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Complaint. The elements of such a claim are simply not pled. There are no allegations in 
the Complaint regarding (1) the fact that the parties entered into a contract: (2) the terms 
and conditions of any contract; (3) Ms. Canfield's performance under the any contract; or 
(4) the City's breach of any contract. Moreover, Ms. Canfield also failed to meet her 
burden in the trial court to establish facts sufficient to show subject matter jurisdiction, 
because she failed to provide the trial court with any evidence whatsoever of a contract or 
any contractual obligation. In light of Ms. Canfield's failure to meet her burden, it was 
appropriate for the trial court to rule on the City's Motion to Dismiss prior to the City's 
filing a reply brief. 
Second, Ms. Canfield's claims cannot be contractual because they are grounded in 
statute since they arise out of the Legislature's mandate that municipalities enact rules 
and regulations as they "deem best" to govern their operations. The City's internal 
discipline and/or termination grievance procedures fall within this statutory grant. The 
Utah Court of Appeals also has recognized that public employers promulgate rules and 
regulations pursuant to statute and not from contract. Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106 (2002) is the basis for the City's termination appeals procedure. 
Third, this Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to Ms. Canfield's failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies by pursuing a grievance or appeal with the City. 
Fourth, this lawsuit is properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata or claim 
preclusion because not only are the parties and Complaint the same as those in the 
previous federal lawsuit, but the federal court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's lawsuit, based 
11 
on her failure to comply with the court's order, constitutes a dismissal on the merits under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. MS. CANFIELD'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD A CONTRACT 
CLAIM. 
1. The Complaint Fails On Its Face To State A Sufficient Claim For The 
Existence Of A Contract With The City, Or The Breach Of A Contract. 
Ms. Canfield contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her lawsuit for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction because her Complaint "sounds in contract" and she 
therefore was not subject to the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
("Act"). This argument is without merit. 
"Compliance with the [Governmental] Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a 
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities." 
Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, f 9, 40 P.3d 632 (citations omitted). Since "[s]ubject matter 
jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy 
presented by the action before it," "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject 
matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fort Trumbull Conservancy v. City of 
New London, 829 A.2d 801, 806 & 806 n.12 (Conn. 2003) (internal citation omitted). 
Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the Act. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38. Under the Act, a claim against a political subdivision is barred 
unless a notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the claim arises. Id. § 63-30-11 and -13; Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 
618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). Compliance with the notice provisions of the Act is a 
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condition precedent to maintaining suit (Hall v. Utah State Dep V of Corrections, 2001 
UT, Tf 23,24 P.2d 958), and the burden of filing a notice of claim rests entirely with the 
plaintiff (Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996)). The requirements of the Act 
must be strictly complied with or dismissal of the action is mandated (Hall, 2001 UT 34, 
123, 24 P.3d 958), and failure to comply precisely with notice requirements deprives a 
court of subject matter jurisdiction (Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 16, 24 
P.3dll56). 
The purpose of a notice of claim '"is to require every claimant to clearly state all 
of the elements of his claim to the city council"' and to "afford the political subdivision 
an opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is of recent memory, witnesses 
are yet available, conditions have not materially changed and to determine if there is 
liability, and if there is, the extent of it." Hall, 2001 UT 34, ^  23, 24 P.3d 958 (citation 
omitted); see also Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998). 
Based on these standards, Ms. Canfield's Complaint was properly dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Complaint on its face fails to assert a 
contract. The word "contract" never appears in the Complaint, and the Complaint fails to 
identify any specific contract or contractual provision. The basis of Ms. Canfield's claim 
is that she was treated "unfairly" and/or differently from other employees and, at most, 
the Complaint generally alludes to "City policy" ®. 12), "Defendant's specific written 
policy" ®. 4), and "personnel policy" ®. 4), but she fails to identify, quote from, or attach 
the specific policy in question. These general references do not show a contract between 
Ms. Canfield and the City. This is particularly true since the City's Policy Manual states 
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that "[t]he policies and statements contained in this manual and in other statements that 
may be issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of any kind 
between the City and its employees." See Layton City Policy Manual, Ex. 12 in Aplee 
Add. 
Second, Ms. Canfield's Complaint fails to plead the elements of a contract claim. 
As support for her argument that she has pleaded a contract claim, Ms. Canfield cites Bair 
v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, ^ 4, 20 P.3d 388, for the following elements of a breach of 
contract claim: "(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach 
of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." However, comparison to Bair only 
underscores the deficiencies in Ms. Canfield's Complaint, since in Bair there were 
express written contracts that were executed by the two parties (Bair, 2001 UT 20, 
ff 2,3,6), and in this case there was no express, written contract that was executed by Ms. 
Canfield and the City. In addition, since Ms. Canfield admits that she resigned6 and does 
not allege in the Complaint that she was denied access to any grievance procedure, she 
has not performed under the so-called contract. Furthermore, since she resigned her 
employment, it is difficult to see how the City could have breached any contract. Finally, 
regarding alleged damages, Ms. Canfield's Complaint in this lawsuit is virtually identical 
to the Complaint removed to the federal court (compare Am. Compl., Case No. 
020800412 (Ex. 1 to Add. to Aplee. Brf.) to Complaint, Case No. 020700620 (Ex. B to 
6Based on the allegations in her Complaint, Ms. Canfield was not constructively 
terminated. "If an employee resigns of her own free will, even as a result of the 
employer's actions, the employee will not be held to have been constructively 
discharged." Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 208 F.3d 847, 858 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted). 
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Aplt. Brf), and she admitted to the Court of Appeals that, in response to interrogatories in 
the federal lawsuit, she requested damages based on tort. See Aplt. Reply Brf., p. 3 n.2. 
Third, Ms. Canfield's Complaint fails to show any breach or violation of a contract 
by the City. Ms. Canfield contends that: (1) she resigned because "officers, employees, 
agents or servants of [Layton City] confronted [her] with the allegation that [she] had 
misused sick leave" ®. 9), and (2) she resigned when faced with either resigning or 
termination because she feared that "a termination would preclude her from gaining 
future gainful employment" ®. 4). These allegations fall far short of the requisite 
pleadings for alleging a breach of any contractual obligation by the City. 
Fourth, in opposing the City's Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Canfield failed to provide 
the trial court with a copy of (or citation of language from) a "contract," or a personnel 
policy, and relied solely on argument. This is significant, since it was Ms. Canfield's 
burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction and she failed to provide evidence to meet 
that burden. A plaintiff that fails to meet this burden should not be allowed on appeal to 
complain of the trial court's alleged error. 
2. Any Employment Rights Of Ms. Canfield Were Grounded In Statute. 
Although Ms. Canfield's explanations of the nature of her claim have varied, her 
claims could not be contractual because they are grounded in statute. Under Utah law, it 
is mandatory that municipalities prescribe rules and regulations as they "deem best" to 
efficiently administer the municipality and its operations: 
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems 
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best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct and business 
of the municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. The City has adopted such operational policies, including 
procedures related to termination and/or discipline of its employees which are consistent 
with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. These operational policies accordingly are grounded 
in statute. 
For example, in Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App. 100, 46 P.3d 247, the 
trial court ruled there was no contract in a situation where public employees were 
employed pursuant to the County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-
1 to -15. Id. at \ 4. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that any alleged rights were 
statutory, not contractual. Id. at fflf 7-9. In making this ruling, the court in Knight 
commented that "public employees' employment rights generally spring not from 
contract, but from legislative policy," {Id. at If 8), and cited as persuasive the following 
statement by the Kansas Supreme Court which notes the lack of analogy between public 
and private employees: 
"There neither is, not can be, an analogy of statuses between public 
employees and private employees, in fact or law, because of the inherent 
differences in the employment relationship arising out of the unique fact 
that the public employer was established by and is run for the benefit of all 
the people and its authority derives not from contract nor the profit 
motive inherent in the principle of free private enterprise, but from the 
constitution, statutes, civil service rules, regulations and resolutions." 
Id. at If 8 n.7 (quoting Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 881 P.2d 567, 571 (Kan. 1994)) 
(emphasis in original). 
As additional support for the contract/statute distinction, Knight cited Weese v. 
Davis County Commission, 834 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1992), as stating that "[t]he county only 
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has those rights and powers granted it by the Utah Constitution and statutes or those 
implied as a necessary means to accomplish them.'VM at U 8 n.7. 
Ms. Canfield disputes Knight's relevance in this case and, quoting Knight, 
contends that rights can be contractual and not statutory where there is "evidence of an 
agreement that 'altered or added to the terms and conditions of public employment.'" See 
Aplt's Opening Brf., p. 11 (citations omitted). This argument does not assist Ms. 
Canfield's contract argument here, however, because she has failed to plead or show an 
agreement in her case that altered or added to the terms of her employment. 
Ms. Canfield also contends that the Court of Appeals in Knight improperly relied 
on Horn v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah 1998), in finding that 
any alleged rights were statutory. See Aplt's Opening Brf., p. 11. However, Ms. Canfield 
fails to show how Horn is distinguishable from her own situation and, in fact, she 
concedes that there was nothing to create an implied contract in Horn so as to alter the 
statutory nature of the claim. Ms. Canfield likewise has failed to cite to anything that 
would alter the statutory nature of her claims. 
Moreover, Ms. Canfield's reliance on Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (1981), as being "comparable to her case" is misplaced. See Aplt's 
Opening Brf, p. 13. In Piacitelli, there was no contention that the plaintiffs alleged 
rights were statutory and not contractual,7 and in fact there is no discussion whatsoever of 
1
 Piacitelli \s also distinguishable because the plaintiff was told by the college that 
he would not receive a contract for the upcoming year, and his objection was that he was 
not allowed to avail himself of the due process procedures provided in the personnel 
policy. By contrast, Ms. Canfield admits she resigned, and contends she is not required to 
exhaust the administrative (due process) procedures provided in the City's Handbook. 
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a statutory basis for plaintiff s alleged rights. Id. at 1064-65. 
In sum, based on these standards and on the grant of authority to municipalities in 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, any alleged rights of the City's employees are statutory and 
not contractual. 
3. The Implied Contract Exception To At-Will Employment Is Irrelevant 
Here. 
As support for her contention that her Complaint establishes a contract on its face, 
Ms. Canfield cites Utah case law addressing the implied contract exception to the general 
rule of "at-will" employment. See Aplt's Opening Brf., pp. 7-8 (citing Benibe v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc., 
Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 
1991)). These cases stand for the proposition that an implied contract may create an 
exception to the "at-will" rule, thereby requiring that any termination be "for cause." 
This argument and the cited case law are inapplicable here. First, all of these cases 
involve private employees, not public employees. Second, Ms. Canfield does not appear 
to claim that she was an "at-will" employee. Third, unlike the employees in the cited 
cases, Ms. Canfield was never terminated; rather, she resigned her employment. 
Moreover, Ms. Canfield cannot argue that the City's Policy Manual created some 
type of implied contract, because the City's Policy Manual expressly states that "[t]he 
policies and statements contained in this manual and in other statements that may be 
issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of any kind between the 
City and its employees." See Layton City Policy Manual, Ex. 12 in Aplee Add. 
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4. An Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Is Not Itself A 
Contract. 
There is no merit to Ms. Canfield's contention that her Complaint establishes on its 
face a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that this is sufficient to 
show a contract claim. See Aplt's Opening Brf., pp. 8-10 (citing as support Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cooks v. lions First Nat 7 Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996)). First, the Complaint does not state on its face the existence of a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. In fact, there is no reference to any such covenant in the 
Complaint. Moreover, a good faith and fair dealing covenant cannot exist alone, and only 
exists where there is a contract in which it is grounded. See Dubois, 872 P.2d at 1078-79. 
Inasmuch as Ms. Canfield has failed to allege the existence of any contract, she cannot 
assert that her Complaint includes a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
5. No Utah Case Law Supports Ms. Canfield's Position, And The Case 
Law She Cites From Other Jurisdictions Is Inapplicable. 
Ms. Canfield's appeal fails to cite any Utah case law dealing with the 
Governmental Immunity Act that supports her position because there is no such law. 
Furthermore, the cases from other jurisdictions cited by Ms. Canfield do not apply here. 
For example, Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, 918 P.2d 7 (N.M. 
1996), involved an employee who was demoted with a reduction in pay, whose lawsuit 
alleged that he was not provided with notice of the basis for his demotion or given a 
chance to improve. Id. at 730. That is not the situation here. There also is nothing in 
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Garcia to show whether a notice of claim was required prior to bringing the lawsuit. 
Most important, unlike here, Garcia was not a case where the plaintiff was required to 
show that a contract and breach were pled on the face of the complaint. 
The second case cited by Ms. Canfield, Harris v. State Personnel Board., 216 CaL 
Rptr. 274 (Ct. App. 1985), is also inapplicable. In that case, the employee's claim was a 
mandamus claim for unpaid back wages. Id. at 276. The court noted that the notice of 
claim requirement did not apply because this was a mandamus claim, and like claims for 
injunctive or declaratory relief, was not subject to that requirement. By contrast, in this 
case Ms. Canfield has not pled a mandamus or other equitable claim. 
C. THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS LACK SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION BECAUSE MS. CANFIELD FAILED TO EXHAUST 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
Ms. Canfield contends in her appellate brief and Complaint that she was 
constructively terminated. Taking Ms. Canfield's Complaint at face value, this lawsuit 
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to her failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
Utah law makes clear that courts lack subject matter jurisdiction when a plaintiff 
fails to exhaust administrative procedures or remedies. For example, in Patterson v. 
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d. 466, the Court dismissed claims brought by a 
real estate developer because the developer failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). Id. fflf 14-16. Patterson recognized that § 10-9-
1001 authorizes municipalities to adopt administrative procedures to govern land use 
decisions, and that American Fork City had done so in its Development Code. Id. f 16. 
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This Court found that the developer's failure to exhaust these procedures resulted in a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. \ 17; see also id. ffl[ 18-19 (discussing failure to 
exhaust remedies). 
Likewise, Ms. Canfield has also failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Utah 
statutory law gives municipalities the authority to prescribe policies and procedures to 
govern their efficient operation as the municipalities "deem best," so long as the policies 
and procedures do not conflict with laws of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. The 
City has done so by establishing procedures for employees to present grievances and 
object to disciplinary actions, performance evaluations, and termination, including an 
appeals process. See Layton City Policies and Procedures, attached as Ex. 13 to Aplee 
App. These policies and procedures regarding termination comport with and are based on 
the procedures and rights set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, including giving the 
employee the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence. 
Although Ms. Canfield contends she was constructively terminated and treated 
differently with regard to the City's policies and procedures, she fails to allege that she 
has been denied access to a grievance/appeals procedure, and indeed she has not. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that Ms. Canfield ever attempted to avail herself of the 
City's available grievance/appeals procedure and, in fact, it is undisputed that she did not 
do so. In light of the Legislature's broad grant of authority to municipalities to regulate 
"operations" as the municipality "deems best," Ms. Canfield was bound to pursue these 
internal remedies before bringing a lawsuit. 
21 
The fact that the exhaustion requirement applies to internal grievance and 
termination procedures of governmental entities is illustrated in numerous cases. For 
example, in Long v. Samson, 568 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1997), the North Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of contract 
and tort claims by a professor who was formerly employed by the University of North 
Dakota. Id. at 606. In affirming, the court agreed with the trial court that the professor 
had failed to exhaust internal administrative remedies set forth in a Faculty Handbook. 
Id. at 603-604. As justification for the exhaustion requirement, the court pointed to the 
following language in a prior decision involving a doctor who failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies at the hospital where she was employed: 
" . . . an exhaustion of remedies requirement serves the salutary function of 
eliminating or mitigating damages. If an organization is given the 
opportunity quickly to determine through the operation of its internal 
procedures that it has committed error, it may be able to minimize, and 
sometimes eliminate, any monetary injury to the plaintiff by immediately 
reversing its initial decision and affording the aggrieved party all 
membership rights; an individual should not be permitted to increase 
damages by foregoing available internal remedies.... Moreover, by 
insisting upon exhaustion even in these circumstances, courts accord 
recognition to the 'expertise' of the organization's quasi-judicial tribunal, 
permitting it to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff s claim in the first instance. 
. . . Finally, even if the absence of an internal damage remedy makes 
ultimate resort to the courts inevitable . . . the prior judicial efficiency will 
still promote judicial efficiency by unearthing the relevant evidence and by 
providing a record which the court may review." 
Id. at 605 (citation omitted). This is consistent with other courts which have held that an 
employee must exhaust internal grievance procedures.8 
%See, e.g., Bockover v. Perko, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (fired 
employee of public university laboratory must exhaust internal grievance procedure 
before filing lawsuit); Aranoffv. Bryan, 569 A.2d 466, 469-470 (Vt. 1989) (law clerk for 
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In this case, Ms. Canfield grounds her claims in the City's policies and procedures, 
but she has failed to allege that she has exhausted the grievance and/or appeals procedures 
applicable to those policies and procedures. If Ms. Canfield or other Utah public 
employees are permitted to file lawsuits without first exhausting internal remedies, the 
judicial system risks inundation with employment-related claims by public employees, 
which are more properly dealt with in the first instance through internal grievance 
procedures. In light of this failure by Ms. Canfield to avail herself of the remedies 
included in the very policies which she now contends amount to a contract, this Court 
should find that there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
D. MS. CANFIELD'S LAWSUIT IS BARRED ON GROUNDS OF RES 
JUDICATA. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that claim preclusion bars a lawsuit if: (1) the prior and present lawsuit involve the same 
parties or their privies, (2) the claim alleged to be barred was presented in the first lawsuit 
or could and should have been raised, and (3) the first lawsuit resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits. Id. at 247; see also Maoris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 
120, 16P.3d 1214. 
In this case, each of the three elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. First, the 
parties in the prior federal lawsuit are identical to the parties in this lawsuit. Second, it is 
obvious that the claim presented in the prior federal lawsuit is the same claim presented in 
state court must exhaust grievance procedure injudicial branch Personnel Policy before 
filing lawsuit); Edgren v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 205 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(dismissal of lawsuit appropriate because architect employed by state university failed to 
exhaust internal grievance policies). 
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this lawsuit because the underlying complaints in the two lawsuits are virtually identical. 
Third, the dismissal of the prior federal lawsuit constitutes a final judgment on the merits. 
Specifically, there was an adjudication on the merits because the federal lawsuit was 
dismissed based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the federal court's Order. See, 
e.g., Henderson v. Consolidated Merck Corp., 286 F. Supp. 697, 698 (N.D. Ga. 1968) 
(dismissal due to failure to comply with court's order is adjudication on the merits under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41). 
The record shows that the federal court dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit because 
she failed to comply with the court's direct order that she file a second amended 
complaint to state her claim(s) specifically. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, 
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order operates as an adjudication on the 
merits:9 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for 
improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates-as an 
adjudication on the merits. 
Fed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b). 
Filings in the federal district court show that, after the court issued an Order to 
Show Cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Ms. 
9This Court has noted that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41, which is 
substantially the same as the federal rule, definitively operates as an adjudication on the 
merits unless a dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an 
indispensable party. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 248. 
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Canfield informed the City's attorneys that her claim was one for due process and 
implicated the Fourteenth Amendment. See IV.B.l, supra (discussing federal lawsuit). 
Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's Order to Show Cause, never 
responded or objected when the City submitted to the federal court the letter in which she 
admitted that her claim was one for due process implicating the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and never responded or objected when the City informed the federal court that Ms. 
Canfield had stated that her claim was a due process claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See id. 
Significantly, the federal court did not follow through on its Order to Show Cause 
by dismissing the lawsuit at that time. Instead, the Federal court retained jurisdiction of 
the lawsuit and, on October 1, 2002, it granted the City's motion requesting that Ms. 
Canfield be ordered to amend her Complaint, and gave Ms. Canfield thirty days in which 
to do so.10 See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 8. 
Ms. Canfield did not amend her complaint as required by the federal court's 
October 1, 2002 Order and, on November 15,2003, the City filed a motion to dismiss 
based on her failure to comply with this court order. See Aplee Add., Ex. 9. On 
November 18, 2002, Judge Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit due to her failure to 
comply with the court's October 1, 2002 Order. See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 10. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ms. Canfield's lawsuit was dismissed due to 
her failure to comply with the court's order to file a second amended complaint, and not 
10The federal court's Order was clearly based on the City's response to the Order to 
Show Cause wherein it had notified the court of Ms. Canfield's admission that she was 
asserting a claim that implicated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The federal court's dismissal of Ms. 
Canfield's prior lawsuit therefore was a dismissal on the merits and, as a result, this 
lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully submits that the trial court's 
dismissal of Ms Canfield's lawsuit should be affirmed. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 2005. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. 
Camille N. Johnson 
Judith D. Wolferts 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant Layton City 
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Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH. P.C. 
2605 Washington B l v d . , S u i t e 300 
Ogden. Utah 84401 
Te lephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVTS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACHELL.E CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality, 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
: Civil No. 020800412 
Judge: Glen R. Dawson 
Defendant. 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains 
and alleges of Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES, JURIfiPICTIOM a VENUE 
1. Machelle Canfield is a resident of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled 
court. 
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4. Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for 
Defendant, Layton City, Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had 
been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13) 
years. During that period of time she was a police 
dispatcher. Approximately six months prior to the 
termination of her employment. Plaintiff was placed under 
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. 
5. Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work 
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and 
stressful envirorment, in an area that is already stress 
ridden, 
6. On 12 June 2 001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and 
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her 
daughter to the doctor's office. Plaintiff reported said 
hours on her time sheet. 
7. Due to the stress situation, Plaintiff decided it was best 
not to go back to work until Lt, Moyes had returned and we 
could resolve th« situation. Plaintiff spoke with Lt* Moyes 
on Monday morning, June 11th! and he had asked if Plaintiff 
should be alright until he got back. Plaintiff thought she 
would. 
8. On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and 
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled 
for the next day. 
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S. Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed to 
be at work. Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m. When 
Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked 
if she needed to leave. Plaintiff said if 5he could skip 
lunch and go home early it would be better. Lisa said she 
would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief, 
Lisa came up several hours later Mid told Plaintiff to go t 
lunch. Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not: going home 
early, 
10. In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone 
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the 
basketball camp that morning. (She has had other ankle 
injuries). 
11. At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff 
she could leave. Plaintiff was surprised. Plaintiff was 
walking out the door and Lisa said she would need a doctor's 
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early. 
12. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, 
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the 
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject: to any 
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever. Accordingly* Plaintiff 
has been treated differently from and more severely than 
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of 
Defendant's specific written policy. 
13. Officers, employees, agents or servants of Defendant 
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confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had 
misused sick l«ava and gave her an ultimatum that she resign 
from the city or face termination. Because of her fear that 
a termination would preclude her from obtaining future 
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against 
her will accepted termination. 
14. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges 
that other employees of City have been subject to 
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other 
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or 
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or 
similar allegations-
15. Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges 
that eaid individuals have not been punished as severely as 
she has, have not been terminated,, or not given an 
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings, 
probation, and other punishment. 
16. Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that 
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or 
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense 
alleged. Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its 
termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts 
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true. 
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WHEREFORE,. Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as 
follows; 
1. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy. 
3. For costs of court and attorney's fees as the same may 
be allowed by law. 
For such other and further relief as the court deems 4. 
DATED 
just and proper, 
this Sf day of March* 2 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
3S52 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah B4067 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 2 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMTLLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
DEFENDANT LAYTON CITY'S 
Plaintiff, ANSWER TO AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, C a s e N a 
Defendant. Judge 
Defendant Layton City hereby answers plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows: 
PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, and on that basis denies the 
allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint. 
3. The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint are legal 
conclusions consisting of allegations regarding jurisdiction and venue, and require no answer. To 
the extent paragraph 3 requires an answer, defendant denies each and every allegation. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. Defendant admits that plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for 
Layton City and had held that position for more than 13 years at the time of her resignation. 
Defendant admits and affirmatively asserts that approximately six months prior to her resignation, 
plaintiff was placed under the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. Defendant denies the 
remaining allegations of paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint. 
6. In response to the allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that on June 12, 2001, plaintiff left work early informing her supervisor Lisa 
Murdock that she was going to take her daughter to the doctor's office. Defendant admits that 
plaintiff reported 4.5 hours sick leave for June 12, 2001. Defendant denies the remaining 
allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint. 
7. In response to the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes on June 11, 2001. Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 
7 of the Amended Complaint concerning plaintiffs thoughts and decision and on that basis denies 
those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
8. In response to the allegations of paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that plaintiff left her shift early on June 12, 2001 and that she called in sick to 
2 
dispatch for the next day. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 8 of the 
Amended Complaint. 
9. In response to the allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that Lisa Murdock told plaintiff that she needed to come to work on June 13, 
2001. Defendant admits that plaintiffs time sheet reflects that she reported to work at 7:00 a.m. 
on June 13, 2001. The remaining allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint are vague 
and ambiguous and on that basis defendant denies them. 
] 0. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
plaintiffs cell phone calls, and on that basis denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of the 
Amended Complaint. 
11. In response to the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to plaintiflPs thoughts 
and the other allegations are vague and ambiguous, and on that basis defendant denies the 
allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint. 
12. As to the allegations of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, defendant admits 
that employees of Layton City have used sick leave. Defendant denies the remaining allegations 
of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint. 
13. In response to the allegations of paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that it confronted plaintiff with her violation of Layton City and Police 
Department Policies and that plaintiff resigned her employment. Defendant is without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations concerning plaintiffs 
3 
"fear" and on that basis denies those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of 
paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint. 
14. In response to the allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that other City employees have been accused of violating City policy. 
Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint. 
15. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint. 
16. In response to the allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant asserts that its personnel policy speaks for itself and any attempt to characterize it is 
denied. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint. 
Defendant denies the allegations of that paragraph of the Amended Complaint which 
begins "WHEREFORE." 
Defendant denies all allegations in the Amended Complaint that relate or are directed to 
defendant unless those allegations are expressly admitted in the Answer. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
As separate and distinct affirmative defenses to plaintiffs causes of action against 
defendant in the Amended Complaint, defendant alleges as follows: 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims as asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations, including, without limitation, §§ 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25(1) and (3), 78-12-
28, 78-12-29 and 78-12-30, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
4 
Third Affirmative Defense 
Defendant is immune and/or this action is barred, in whole or in part, by virtue of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), including, 
without limitation, §§ 63-30-3, -4, -5, -10, -11, -13, -15, and -19, and by plaintiffs failure to 
comply with the provisions of said Act. In any event, defendant's liability is limited by said Act, 
as provided by, inter alia, § 63-30-34, Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended). 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are not actionable as pled. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Defendant specifically denies violating any federal or state constitutional, statutory, or 
common law right of the plaintiff. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a denial of due 
process. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any. Plaintiff is thereby barred in whole or 
in part from recovering monetary damages from defendant. In addition, or alternatively, any 
compensation or benefits received by plaintiff after her resignation, including unemployment 
compensation, must be applied to reduce any damages claimed by plaintiff 
5 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment, and is, therefore, estopped and has 
waned any right to bring claims or seek damages or other relief from any defendant, including but 
not limited to reinstatement, back pay, or future pay. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff waived her rights, if any, to seek damages or other relief from defendant. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting any and all causes of action against defendant. 
Eleventh Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of unclean hands from all forms of equitable relief 
sought in her Amended Complaint. 
Twelfth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of laches from all forms of relief sought in her 
Amended Complaint. 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust applicable procedural, administrative, statutory or judicial 
remedies otherwise available to her, and this action is therefore barred, in whole or in part. 
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense 
All acts or omissions of defendant were undertaken in good faith, without malice, with 
probable cause, and were fully justified and reasonable under the circumstances. 
6 
Fifteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs actions violated applicable rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and/or 
standards of behavior. Any actions of defendant were in response to plaintiffs actions and were 
reasonable and justified under the circumstances. 
Sixteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs punitive damages claim, if any, must be established in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. §78-18-1. 
Seventeenth Affirmative Defense 
As a matter of law, plaintiffis not entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages from 
defendant. 
Eighteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff must prove her claim for punitive damages by a unanimous verdict, and the 
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Nineteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs punitive damage claims are barred by the prohibition ofex postfacto laws in 
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, and the Open Courts provision, Article I, Section II 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Twentieth Affirmative Defense 
Defendant did not act with actual malice or reckless indifference, and any award of 
punitive damages is barred. 
7 
Twenty-First Affirmative Defense 
The punitive damages claims are barred by the United States Constitution and 
amendments thereto, including: Article I, Section 10[1] (Contracts Clause); Fifth Amendment 
(Due Process); Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Excessive Fines); and 
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection). 
Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense 
The punitive damages claims are barred by the Constitution of Utah, including Article 1, 
Section 7 (Due Process), Section 9 (Excessive Fines; Cruel and Unusual Punishment), and 
Section 12 (Self-incrimination). 
Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, defendant is entitled to recover reasonable 
attorneys' fees against plaintiff on the grounds that this action, in whole or in part, is brought 
without merit and has not been brought or asserted in good faith. 
Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Defendant is protected by the doctrines of qualified and good faith immunity both at 
common and under statutory law. 
Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs recovery, if any, is limited by Utah Code Ann., §§ 63-30-22 and -34. 
Twenty-Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs damages, if any, were not caused by an official policy or custom of defendant. 
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Twenty-Seventh Affirmative Defense 
Defendant cannot be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiff take nothing from defendant by way of her Amended Complaint, and 
that the Amended Complaint against defendant be dismissed, with prejudice; 
2. That defendant be awarded its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred herein; and 
3. That this Court award such other and farther relief as it may deem just. 
DATED this %_ day of April, 2002. 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. Preston ' 
Camille N. Johnson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
N:\13607\520\Plcadings\Answer to Amended Complaint2.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 3 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMLLEN. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF A CIVIL 
p,aintiff> ACTION FROM STATE COURT TO 
FEDERAL COURT 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, C a s e N a 
Defendant. Judge 
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443 and 1446, defendant Layton City, through its attorneys, 
hereby gives NOTICE OF REMOVAL of the civil action pending against it in the Second District 
Court of the County of Davis, State of Utah, to this Court. Layton City alleges as grounds for 
removal the following: 
1. On March 19, 2002, Layton City was served with a Summons and Amended 
Complaint in the civil action titled Machelle Canfield v. Lavton City, a Utah municipality. Civil 
No. 020800412, which commenced in the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of 
Davis, State of Utah. 
2. The Amended Complaint alleges an equal protection claim under a federal statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
3. This Court has original jurisdiction of the above-entitled action, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and hence, this action may be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1441, 1443. Copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint are attached hereto. 
WHEREFORE, defendant Layton City hereby submits notice that the above-entitled 
matter is removed from the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of Davis, State 
of Utah, to this Court, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By \H^y- fliKln 
Stanley J. Preston A 
Camille N. Johnson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
N:\13607\520\Plcadings\Removal-Federal Ctwpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 4 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR AN 
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 
vs. FILE A SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT THAT STATES 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION 
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce 
Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully 
submits this memorandum in support of its motion for an order requiring plaintiff to file a 
Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On March 18, 2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County, Bountiful Department, State of Utah. 
2. The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29, 
2002. 
3. Based upon the Amended Complaint, the City believed that plaintiff was 
attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 8, 2002, 
the City removed the action on that basis. 
4. On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff 
demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to 
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal. 
5. On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the 
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report, 
signed by plaintiffs attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002. 
6. On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial 
disclosures on July 12, 2002. 
7. On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document 
requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests. 
8. An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22,2002. During 
the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended 
-2-
Complaint whether plaintiff was asserting an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiffs attorney, in 
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton 
City policies, not an Equal Protection claim. 
9. On August 22, 2002, the parties were ordered to show cause why this case should 
not be remanded to state court. 
ARGUMENT 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must, as a threshold matter, determine 
questions of jurisdiction. SeeMontoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). Based upon 
the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that plaintiff was 
attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City removed 
the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial 
disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a 
question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the 
plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal 
Protection claim. No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment" 
gives rise to equal protection issues.1 
The Court has now ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be 
remanded to state court. However, based on the vagueness of the Amended Complaint, it is 
unclear what cause of action plaintiff is attempting to assert, and whether she has attempted to 
*The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton 
City does not have a civil service commission. 
-3-
state a claim under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Thus, it cannot be 
determined, based upon the current state of the pleadings, whether this Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over this action. 
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file 
a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City. 
DATED this Kcfa day of August, 2002. 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. Piston J 
Camille N.uohinspn 
Maralyn M. Rigger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\13607\520\Pleadings\DefinitcStatcmcntMem.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 5 
FILED _ 
IN THE UNITED STAT£S DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OFUT AH : ; !'!P,T 
22 AUG 02 PM 3=31 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
DISTRiCT OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFIELD. 
Plaintiff(s) 
v. 
BY:. 
LAYTON CITY, 
Defendant(s). 
DEPUTY CLERK 
Case No. 02-NC-41 DK 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
The above entitled matter was removed 'from state court on defendant's 
contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42 USC § 1983 . The plaintiff 
did not allege such a claim and at pretrial before the magistrate judge plaintiff 's 
counsel asserted there was no federal equal protection claim being pursued. 
Therefore, the case involves only state issues of violation of plaintiff 's rights under 
Layton City's civil service standards. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the parties shall, on or before September 28, 2 0 0 2 , 
show cause why this case should not be remanded to state court under 28 USC § 
1441(c) and § 1447(c). 
DATED this t)Q- day of August . 2002 . 
BY THE COURT: 
)ale Kimball, Judge 
^ 
United States District Court 
$s*c& 
Dodged lor: 
Docketed by: 
Secretary 
ce 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
August 23, 20 02 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK. * * 
l:02-cv-00041 
ie and correct copies of the attached were either mailed or faxed by the 
srk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3 9 86 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 84403 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
JFAX 9,3630400 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 6 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLEN.JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHR]STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN 
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 
FILE A SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT THAT STATES 
CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION 
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce 
Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully 
moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states 
clearly any cause of action asserted against the City. 
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that 
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
City removed the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, 
initial disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in 
response to a question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time 
that the plaintiff was not asserting an Equal Protection claim. The Court has now ordered the 
parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to state court. However, based on the 
vagueness of the Complaint, it is now unclear what claim plaintiff is asserting and whether this 
Court has jurisdiction over this matter. 
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring the plaintiff to 
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the 
City. 
DATED this ^pft day of August, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. Preston S 
Camille Nl^Fohpstfn 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\l 3607\520\Pleadings\DefinitcStatcmcntMotion.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 7 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLEN.JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE T O 
Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
vs. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
LA V 1 ON CITS, \i Utah municipality, 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. 
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
Defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully submits this response to the Court's 
Order to Show Cause why this case should not be remandni u i Miii in 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On March 18,2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County, Bouni epartment, State i>l' 11: .>!• i . , , ui \\v /\\\\< ruled 
Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Amended Complaint does not identify a "cause 
of action" or "claim for relief." 
2. The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29, 
2002. 
3. Based upon the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the City believed that 
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On 
April 8, 2002, the City removed the action on the grounds that this Court had original jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. 
4. On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff 
demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to 
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal. 
5. On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the 
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report, 
signed by plaintiffs attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002. 
6. On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial 
disclosures on July 12,2002. 
7. On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document 
requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests. 
8. An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22, 2002. During 
the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended 
>al Protection claim. I lii i:i itifPs attorney, ii \ 
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton 
City policies, not an EqUaj Protection claim. 
Ii :i ligl it ()! plaintiffs attorney's comments, counsel for the City asked, in writing, 
that plaintiffs attorney identify with specificity the plaintiffs claim. 
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against 
Layton City. 
11 City's Motion, however he did 
respond in writing to the City's request that he identify with specificity his client's claim. Mr. 
Smith's September 20, 2002 letter to counsel for the City prov it I* ? 
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton 
City failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her 
job without due process of law. 
I suppose as to the depravation [sic] of due process Federal'Fourteenth 
Amendment case law would be implicated. 
See September 20,2002 letter attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
-3-
ARGUMENT 
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that 
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
City removed the action on that basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question 
jurisdiction). Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial disclosures were 
made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a question by 
Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the plaintiff was 
asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal Protection claim. 
No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment" gives rise to equal 
protection issues.1 Now, plaintiffs attorney has identified his client's claim as one for 
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
See Exhibit B. That being the case, this Court has original jurisdiction of the case under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331,2 and the case should not be remanded to state court. 
The City asks not only that this Court retain jurisdiction of this case, but that it grant the 
City's Motion for an Order Requiring Plaintiff to File a Second Amended Complaint that States 
Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton City. The vagueness of the Amended 
]The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton 
City does not have a civil service commission. 
228 U.S.C. § 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
Complaint can only be remedied with an amendment which pleads the cause of action plaintiff 
DATED this <&Sft day of September, 2002. 
SNOW ,(11 k IS i b N KII II4 k M, \ I (1 IN LA U 
Stanley L Prestoj 
Camille>L-J<5linson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nil 3607\520\Pleadings\Rcsponse OSC.wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Case No. 1:02CV00041, United Slates 
District Court, District of Utah) was served on the parties listed below by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this J ^ - d a y of September, 2002. 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EXHIBIT A 
KTO i::52 FAX SOI 646 S LAYTON CITY ADMIN. lgj w « » 
Brad C. Smith. NO. tfcbf 
STEVENSON & SMITH. P.C 
2605 Washington Blvd . Zv , , 0 
Ogden, Utah B4401 
Telephones (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
TN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVJS COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
MACHEIdJE CANFIELD, "" """ :~ 
Plaintiff, : AMKNDKJL, • r«ni ',/iJ.tri 
i Civil No. 020800412 
Judge: Glen R. Dawson 
LAYTON CITY, a h 
municipality, 
• 
Defendant. 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains 
and alleges \ follows: 
Mac: 1 ml ] e Canfield is a resident oi Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
Defendant Layton Cit> Utah municipality, locate I m 
Davis county, SLCIL -
j„ Venue and jurisdiction arc proper , n the CIEJOVM r m i i .« > n 
court. 
/21/02 THU 10:19 FAX 801 225, 
D/02 WED 12:52 FAX 801 546 8 
_ URMMA 
LAYTON CIW ADMIN. 
IfiUUJ) 
4 * 
s g T » 
111 s 
hi* 
* 81* 
I 1 ! * 
TKCVOhL AkLBOJUTIOHg 
4. plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher fox 
Defendant, Layton City,. Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had 
been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13) 
years. During that period of time she was a police 
dispatcher. Approximately six months prior to the 
termination of her employment, Plaintiff was placed under 
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. 
5> Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work 
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and 
stressful environment, in an area that is already stress 
ridden. 
6. On 12 June 2001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and 
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her 
daughter to the doctor'6 office. Plaintiff reported said 
hours on her time sheet. 
7. Due to the stress situation, Plaintiff decided it was best 
not: to go back to work until Lit, Moyes had returned and we 
could resolve the situation. Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes 
on Monday morning, June 11th, and he had asked if Plaintiff 
should be alright until he got back. Plaintiff thought she 
would. 
8. On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and 
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled 
for the next day. 
WED 3?:fi,¥ FAX *"nl *46 « LAYTON CITY ADMIN. IfcJiiWO 
$. ifciff back and said that Plaintiff needed to 
be laintiff went tn wt i 
tune iij cw «_-.* * the morning, Las a asked 
if she needed to leave. could «Oci 
lunch and go home early it would t * better . :r» " 
would see what relief 
Lisa came up several hours later and told 
i mi in i I I I. £ assumed that meant «,§- > ^ . .. going home 
early. 
I U . ui" "be meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on be rt ij phone 
and said M i I.IM Y and ankle wer-p hurting from the 
basketball camp that morning. (She has 
injuries) , 
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 " • -i IM" p.ii' I ,,! - 'i « " «i "- P » i i" i i, h and told Plaintiff 
she could leave. Plaintiff was surprised 
>t'N. . • " I" " - she-would need a doctor's 
excuse for the one iiour 
12. Plaintiff i i; informed and believes, and thereupon - leges, 
t j i a t nUftieroua -ity have used sick leave in the 
same manner as Plaintiff but have I hnii nut'i it.1*: '"i i •• ) • 
• i proceeding whatsoevei Accordingly # Plaintiff 
has been treated differently merely than 
"""her employees of Defendant, all contravention » i 
Defendant' 8 specif 31 I/,I i" ! " " | • 
u . Officers, employees, .agents f«i' servants of Defendant 
D/02 WED 1 2 : S 3 FAX SOI 546 9 LAYTON CITY ADMIN. 
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confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had 
misused sick leave and gave her an ultimatum that she resign 
from the city or face termination. Because of her fear that 
a termination would preclude her from obtaining future 
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against 
her will accepted termination. 
14. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges 
that other employees of City have been subject to 
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other 
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or 
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or 
similar allegations. 
15. Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges 
that said individuals have not been punished as severely as 
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an 
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings, 
probation, and other punishment. 
16. Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that 
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or 
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense 
alleged* Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its 
termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts 
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true. 
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WHEREFORE, dgment against Defendant as 
follows; 
1. imount to be proven at t r i a l . 
* reinstatement or other appropriii ( r *u * If . 
3 . costs of r; niui L djid attorney'5 fees as the same may 
be allowed 'by law. 
^. i rir such other and furthei rel ief as the court deertve 
j u s t proper. 
DATED this / £ day of Marc^ 2002. 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney for pi •*• i""tt i if 
Plaintiffs Address: 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Hnv. Utah, 84067 
EXHIBIT B 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
3986 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
H. THOMAS £- OGDEN, UTAH 84403 
BRAD C. SMIT* 1ELEF HONE (801) 399-9910 OR (801) 394-4573 
•ADMITTED m Ui* FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 9 - 9 9 5 4 
September 20,2002 
Camille N. Johnson 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utai 
Machelle Canfield v, Layton City 
Dear Camille, 
You have requested that I provide you with some sort of more definitive statement as to 
what my client's claims are. I thought this was covered while we were in court However, I will 
oblige your request. 
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton City 
failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her job without due 
process of law. 
I suppose as to the depravation of due process Federal Fourteenth Amendment case law 
would be implicated. However, contrary to the representation you made in your removal 
notification I have not and have not intended to assert an equal protection claim arising under 42 
U.S.C. §1983. At present I am unaware of any facts which would suggest that Ms. Canfield was 
denied equal protection of the law based on any invidious or forbidden group membership. I am 
unaware of any evidence that would show that Ms. Canfield was terminated or subjected to a 
subjective termination as a result of .her gender, age, race, religion, handicap, or national origin. 
Accordingly, I do not believe there is any equal protection claim to be made here and have not 
intended to make one. 
If you have any other questions on this matter please iixii 1111 11»i, < miact me. 
Kespallulh 
Brad C. Smith 
O F C O U N S E L : 
DAVID S. K U N Z 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 8 
FILED 
CI.L-RK. US. DISTRICT COURT 
- I OCT 02 PM 1*56 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TTHB WftTWriflfttfTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION *|fcpUTY CLEM" 
MACHIELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to 
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton 
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to 
comply and file an Amended Complaint. 
DATED this _L_~day of October, 2002. 
B Y T H E C O U R T : 
SAMUEL ALBA 
United States Magistrate Judge 
aep 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
October 2, 2 002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
: l:02-cv-00041 
ae and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
the clerk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3 986 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 844 03 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
EFAX 9,3630400 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 9 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
Defendant Layton City moves to dismiss the captioned case for plaintiffs failure to 
comply with the Court's October 1, 2002 Order which requires plaintiff to file a Second 
Amended Complaint on or before October 31, 2002. The bas;is for this Motion is set forth with 
more particularity in the accompanying Memorandum. 
DATED this \ffr day of November, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
*restor 
Camille(N. Johrfson 
Maralyn MTReger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\13607\520\Pieadings\Moiion to Dismiss.wpd 
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STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
Plaintiff, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. 
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
Defendant Layton City submits this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the 
captioned case for plaintiffs failure to comply with this Court's Order. 
On October 1, 2002, this Court signed an Order granting Layton City's Motion to Compel 
and ordering plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action 
asserted against defendant Layton City. The Court gave plaintiff 30 days in which to comply and 
file the Second Amended Complaint. See Order attached as Exhibit "A." Plaintiff has failed to 
comply with the Court's Order in that she has not filed a Second Amended Complaint. For her 
failure to comply, this case should be dismissed. 
DATED this |Sf> day of November, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By_ 
[fey J. Preston ) 
lilleNUohnsDiT 
Stan! 
Camill  
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\I3607\520\Pleadings\Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss.wpd 
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EXHIBIT A 
FILED 
CI.ERK.US.DISTRICT CUURT 
-I OCT 02 PH 1*56 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TEHBTflfiTO^tft^JfTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION * ^ p U T y CLEHK " 
MACHIELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to 
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton 
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to 
comply and file an Amended Complaint. 
DATED this _ / _ _ ^ a y of October, 2002. 
B Y T H E C O U R T : 
SAMUEL ALBA 
United States Magistrate Judge 
asp 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
October 2, 2002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: l:02-cv-00041 
True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mai] 
by the clerk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 84403 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
EFAX 9,3630400 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 10 
FILED 
18 N0VQ2PM 2^5 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D I S T R I O ^ $ $ F \ $ $ A M UTAH 
BY= 
NORTHERN DIVISION DEPUTY CLERK 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 1:02CV41K 
On October 1, 2002, this court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff, within thirty days, to 
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against Layton 
City. As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has not complied with the court's Order. 
Based upon Plaintiffs failure to comply, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs 
case is DISMISSED. . 
DATED this / P ? a v of November, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
U^XJZ. a^7 
DALE A. KIM. 
United States District Judge 
92-
asp 
United StateB District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
November 19, 2002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
l:02-cv-00041 
jie and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
the clerk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 844 03 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
EFAX 9,3 63 04 00 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 11 
Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
V S . 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality, 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
: DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
Judge: Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and answers 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
Interrogatory Ho. 1; Identify each person whom you 
anticipate that you will call or may call as a witness at the 
time of trial of this matter and state the topic or subject 
matter upon which each such witnesses will testify, the substance 
of the testimony of each witness with respect to each topic or 
subject matter, and the identity of all documents which relate to 
or concern any such testimony. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 1: Plaintiff has not yet 
determined who she will call as witnesses at the time of trial, 
^
 n
 "? o 
_ ^  A a> 
< r g g 
-* o o w 
CD O X K 
• O £j o 
when this determination is made, Plaintiff will supplement this 
interrogatory. Plaintiff anticipates that her witnesses may 
include: Debbie PettiJohn, Layton Police Dispatch; Laree Hopkins, 
Layton Police Dispatch; Debbie Joubert, Layton Police Dispatch; 
Blake Haycock, Layton Police Officer; Lt. Quinn Moyes, Layton 
Police; and Lisa Murdock, Layton Police Dispatch. The above 
named individuals have knowledge of the circumstances of my 
separation with Layton City, my "Garrity" hearing, my use of sick 
leave, and my job performance. 
Interrogatory No, 2; Identify all documents that you 
anticipate presenting to a witness or the trier of the fact at 
the trial of this matter, whether as an exhibit or otherwise. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 2; Machelle Canfield's Leave 
Time.Sheet, Memorandum to Lt. Quinn Moyes from Plaintiff. Machelle 
Canfield, Certificate to return to work or school from IHC Health 
Center. Plaintiff has not yet determined who she will call as 
witnesses at the time of trial, when .this determination is made, 
Plaintiff will supplement this interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No, 3; Describe with specificity all damages 
Ms. Canfield claims she has suffered as a result of the actions 
of the City complained of in her Amended Complaint, and all 
information concerning any such damages, including, without 
limitation: the precise nature of the damages suffered, the 
amount of any such damages, how each damages amount was 
calculated or estimated, and identify each person involved in 
calculating such damages or who otherwise has knowledge of the 
basis for and method of calculation for such damages and 
summarize each such person's involvement and/or knowledge. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 3: 
Past Wages 
2 July 2001 - 9 January 2002 
unemployed: 
at Layton: 
17.26/hr. X 40 x (211 days / 7) 
= $20,810.63 
15 January 2002 - 5 July 2002 
IRS 
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x (171 / 7) 
= $5,628.34 
Future Wages 
5 July 2002 - 2022 
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x 52 x 20 = $239,616.00 
Plaintiff is also entitled to general damages for suffering 
and humiliation. Plaintiff anticipates claiming an amount equal 
to front and back pay for general damages. 
The following individuals would have knowledge of the basis 
for and method of calculation for economic damages as they were 
her superiors and they participated in her performance reviews 
and have knowledge of her hourly wage, etc.: 
Lt. Quinn Moyes# Layton Police Dept. , 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton 
801-546-8300 
Chief Terry Keefe, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton 
801-546-8300 
3 
the nature of the employment sought, identify each person you 
communicated with, identify all documents that refer or relate to 
contact with that person or entity, and describe the outcome of 
your contact with that individual or entity. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 10: See response to Request for 
Production of Documents No. 13. 
Interrogatory No. 11; If you are aware of the existence of 
any written or recorded statement made by any party or potential 
witness, identify the person making the statement, the date of 
the statement, a summary of the contents of the statement, the 
name, address, telephone number and occupation of the person or 
persons taking the statemsmt, and the name, address and telephone 
number of the person now in possession of the original statement. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: Plaintiff is aware that her 
"Garrity" hearing was partially recorded. 
DATED this ^ day of .£*§|fst, 2002. rj 
Machelle Canfield/J 
Plaintiff IS 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah 84067 
7 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
ss. 
) 
On the y day of jB^^t^J 2002, at Ogden, Utah, personally 
appeared before me Machelle Canfield, the signer of the within 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
Notary Public 
JULIE S.WILLIAMS 
863 25TH STREET 
OGDEN, UT 84414 
MyCommUalonE*p1r«s 
JUNE 28, 2003 
gf At I 0^ UTAH 
RY PUBLIC 
ding at Ogden, 
lU am. 
Utah 
My Commission Expires 
b--d%-a 
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Introduction 
The following personnel policies (3000 and 4000 series) set forth City policies and 
procedures for personnel administration, risk management and safety, as well as the 
conditions of employment with the City and the basis for compensation and benefits. 
The information contained in these policies shall be considered official policy of the Layton 
City Corporation arid may be revised from time to time by the City Manager or City 
Council with or without notice to the employee. The official interpretation of all matters 
dealt with in this manual shall be the responsibility of the City Manager. 
The policiesjmd statements contained in this maymal and In other \ 
he issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of anv kind MWftffft 
flM Citv and its employees. Although thev reflect current policy, thev mav. at anv time 
and for anv reason, with or without notice to employees, be changed or rescinded. 
Department Directors may, with the approval of the City Manager, establish additional 
policies and procedures as they deem necessary for the efficient and orderly administration 
and supervision of their departments, provided that they do not conflict with policies and 
procedures established in this manual. 
1of2 3001 
Philosophy of Service 
The purpose of the City is to provide those services which the City Council deems 
necessary and desirable for the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Lay ton. 
Essentially, all that each City employee does should be for the public benefit and advantage 
of the people residing within the corporate limits of Layton City, thus promoting their 
greater prosperity and general welfare. 
Specifically, the purpose of each department of the City is to provide the highest possible 
level of service at the most reasonable cost to the citizens. 
Employment Philosophy 
The quality of the services provided by the City is dependent upon the individual initiative 
and responsibility of its employees. Successful employees are self-motivated, perceptive, 
problem-solvers, service-oriented, have an eye for detail, and follow a job through to its 
completion in a professional manner. 
Most work in the City is accomplished on a team basis. A productive and successful 
employee is expected to be able to work with others in a cooperative manner to accomplish* 
the purpose of the City. The unifying force of team action is communication. To this end, 
pertinent job-related information must be shared and communicated with all others in the 
City who have an interest or concern in the outcome of any job or endeavor. 
The City, therefore, seeks to attract and retain the most highly qualified and competent 
employees who exhibit the qualities and characteristics consistent with the job to be 
performed. 
Enforcement Qf Ppligies and Procedures 
The Department Director should enforce the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures and 
implement all procedures necessary to carry out the responsibilities of their respective 
departments consistent with these policies. The Department Director should notify .all 
departmental employees of these policies and any amendments. 
Perspnnsl Administration 
The administration of all personnel matters, except those specifically reserved by the City 
Council, are the responsibility of the City Manager. The City Manager may delegate these 
responsibilities to the Assistant City Manager. The City Manager or Assistant City 
Manager, as authorized, shall administer the personnel system provided by this personnel 
policy pursuant to approved rules and regulations and applicable law. 
2 of 2 3001 
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Appeals/Greivances Not Involving Termination or Transfer Discipline 
If a Layton City employee wishes to appeal a performance evaluation, disciplinary action, or 
register a grievance, the supervisor should instruct the employee in the following procedures: 
1. A written notification of appeal must be filed with the Department Director within 5 
working days of the interview for the performance evaluation, disciplinary action or 
grievance, except as described in Paragraph 7. 
In cases involving the appeal of a performance evaluation, this notification should state 
the specific reason(s) why the appraisal is being appealed. 
2. The Department Director will meet with the supervisor and with the employee separately 
to discuss the appeal and obtain relevant information. 
3. The Department Director will then determine if the appeal has merit. 
4. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does have merit, a meeting will be 
held with the employee, the supervisor, the Department Director, and the Personnel 
Department to discuss an appropriate resolution to the situation. 
5. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does not have merit, the employee 
will be informed, in writing, of the Department Director's decision. Written notification 
of denial of an appeal will be made within fifteen working days from the time the original 
written appeal was filed. 
l o f 5 3802 
6. If the employee wishes to pursue the appeal further, the employee may file a written 
notice of appeal with the City Manager within five working days from the time he 
received notice that the original appeal was officially denied. The City Manager will 
then review the facts of the situation, interview the involved parties, and make a written 
determination regarding the appeal within fifteen working days. 
7. If an employee's supervisor is a Department Director, the written appeal may be filed 
directly with the City Manager within five working days of the interview for the 
performance evaluation, disciplinary action or grievance. The Department Director will 
then be notified of the appeal and the City Manager will handle the appeal process in 
place of the Department Director, as outlined in Numbers 2 through 5 above. The City 
Manager's decision on an appeal will be final. 
Appeals of Termination or Transfer to a Position of Less Remuneration 
(See chapter 2.55 of the Lay ton City Municipal Code) 
Right of Appeal 
No appointive officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 U.C.A. shall be discharged 
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his or her politics or religious 
beliefs, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body or 
heads of departments. In all cases where an appointive officer or regular full time employee, 
other than the City Manager and heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a 
position with less remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full time employee shall 
have the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter. 
Appeal Procedure 
All administrative appeals shall be processed according to the following procedure: 
(1) The appeal shall be taken by filing a written notice of such appeal with the personnel 
director within ten days after discharge or transfer. Upon filing of such appeal, the 
personnel director shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to said appeal board. Upon 
receipt of the referral from the personnel director, the appeal board shall forthwith 
commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the 
matter which relates to the cause for such discharge or transfer, 
(2) TTie officer or employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented by 
counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront any witness whose testimony is to be 
considered, to call witnesses, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal 
board. 
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(3) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or employee 
may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the City Manager whose decision shall be 
final. 
(4) In the event the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer, then the 
supervisor or department head may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the 
governing body of the city whose decision shall be final after hearing the evidence in the 
same manner as provided for in the appeal to the appeal board. 
Appeal Board 
There is hereby created an appeal board to consist of five members, two of whom shall be 
members of the governing body and three of whom shall be chosen by and from the 
appointive officers and employees of the city. 
Selection of Board Members 
The city recorder will give notice that applications and nominations are being accepted for 
the appeal board. Any officer or employee may apply or may nominate another officer or 
employee. The city recorder shall establish a reasonable notice procedure and time period 
for this process. All people nominated will be notified and given an opportunity to accept 
the nomination or withdraw their name from consideration. At the end of the applica-
tion/nomination period the city recorder shall forward all remaining names to the City 
Manager. The members of the appeal board shall be selected through an election which shall 
be conducted by the city recorder and which allows all appointive officers and regular full 
time employees of the city an opportunity to cast a vote. In addition to the three appointive 
officers and regular full time employees elected to the board, alternate members shall also 
be elected to serve on the board in the event of an absence or if a conflict of interest should 
arise involving another board member. 
Election of Board Members 
The City Manager shall present the names of five officers or employees to be considered by 
the general body of employees of Layton City 4o sit on the appeal board. These names shall 
be given to the city recorder. After receiving the names, the city recorder shall then prepare 
a ballot for the election of said appeal board members. Votes shall be cast, either yes or no, 
in favor of each individual nominee by the city employees. If all are affirmed the City 
Manager will determine which members are to be the alternates. If any are not affirmed, by 
receiving yes votes totaling less than 50% of the votes cast, the City Manager shall present 
an additional name or names, in a number equivalent to those not affirmed, for a second 
election process. The two board members to be chosen from the governing body shall be 
appointed by the mayor. 
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Conflict of Interest 
No member of the appeal board shall hear an appeal from the department in which the 
member is employed or administers. Nor shall a member hear an appeal in which the member 
is related to the appealing employee through blood or marriage. For purposes of this section, 
related persons shall include and be limited to: father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, 
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-
in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law. 
Vacancy on the Board 
If a vacancy occurs on the board the member shall be replaced by the first alternate board 
member in the case of an appointed officer or employee. The City Manager shall then 
present a name for the election process. This newest member then becomes the second 
alternate. 
In the case of a vacancy by a member of the governing body, the mayor shall appoint a 
replacement for the remainder of the term. 
No Compensation for Board Members 
Members of the appeal board shall receive no compensation for services. 
Quorum 
Three or more members of the appeals board shall constitute a quorum sufficient to hear 
appeals. 
Board Decisions 
The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the 
personnel director within fifteen days from the date the matter is referred to it. The board 
may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his/her salary for the period of 
time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency in salary for the period he was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration but not to exceed a fifteen day period. In no 
case shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal 
is taken, except upon a concurrence of the City Manager. 
Counting Board Ballots 
After balloting, the decision shall be counted, and revealed in the presence of the same 
members that voted. A simple majority of quorum voting will determine the decision. A 
member may not abstain from voting. The voting shall be limited to upholding or reversing 
the decision before the board on appeal. 
4 of 5 3802 
Board Reverses Decision and Employee Salary 
In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer to a position of 
less remuneration, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also 
to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The employee shall 
be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following the certification by the 
recorder of the appeal boards decision, provided that the employee, or officer concerned, 
reports for his assigned duties during that next working day. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 14 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 10-3-1106 
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees 
and termination of term of office. 
Duration 
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members 
of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being 
subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided. 
History: C. 1953,10-3-1105, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction. 
De facto officer. 
Duration of term. 
Removal. 
—Council to concur. 
—Right to appeal. 
—Who holds power. 
—Without cause. 
Construction. 
The language "as hereinafter provided" in 
this section specifically refers to the sections 
that follow. Therefore, "any officer* in § 10-3-
1106 must mean any officer not excluded in this 
section. Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), afiTd, 798 R2d 757 (Utah 
1990). 
De facto officer. 
Where the person in possession of a city office 
is at most only a de facto officer, he is subject to 
removal at any time and is not in a position to 
complain of the city council's action abolishing 
office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812 
(1897). 
Duration of term. 
City marshal's term will not in any event last 
beyond the next municipal election even though 
no successor be appointed. Taylor v. Gunderson, 
107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
Removal. 
—Council to concur. 
The consent of a majority of the council is 
necessary for removal of officer. State ex rel. 
Breeden v. Sheets, 26 Utah 105, 72 P. 334 
(1903). 
Assuming that the city marshal was right-
fully holding office, the attempt by the mayor to 
remove him without the concurrence of the 
council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v. 
Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918). 
—Right to appeal. 
The legislature intended specifically to ex-
clude a chief of police, and hence "head" of a 
police "department," from the appeal provisions 
of § 10-3-1106. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 
757 (Utah 1990). 
—Who holds power. 
When this section is read in connection with 
former § 10-6-30 (see present § 10-3-916), it 
will be seen that the same authorities who have 
the power of appointment, the mayor and city 
council, have the power of removal. Taylor v. 
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437,154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
—Without cause. 
It is the legislative intent that a city marshal 
in cities of the third class may be removed 
without cause. Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah 
437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§§ 496 to 501, 552, 719. 
AX.R. — Pre-employment conduct as ground 
for discharge of civil service employee having 
permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488. 
Determination as to good faith in abolition of 
public service or employment subject to civil 
service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d 1165. 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer — Appeals 
Procedure. 
Board — 
(1) No officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 shall be discharged 
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or 
461 
10-3-1106 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective 
omcers, governing body, or heads of departments. In all cases where any officer 
or employee is discharged or transferred from one position to another for any 
reason, he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board 
to be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of 
whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and 
two of whom shall be members of the governing body. 
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the 
recorder within ten days after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the 
appeal the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to the appeal 
board. Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal 
board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence 
and hilly hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge or transfer. 
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented 
by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony 
is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal 
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the 
omcer or employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing 
body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not 
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further 
proceedmgs shall be had. 
S I 1 ? ? dlCision o f t h e a p p e a l b o a r d shaa b e by secret ballot, and shall be 
certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it. 
ihe board may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his 
salary for the period of time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency 
in salary for the period he was transferred to a position of less remuneration 
but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or 
employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon 
a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body 
of the municipality. 
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or 
transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and 
also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The 
employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day 
following the certification by the recorder of the appeal board's decision, 
provided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his assigned duties 
during that next working day. 
? ) i .T hf m e t h o d a n d manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, 
and the designation of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the governing 
body of each municipality by ordinance, but the provisions for choosing the 
three members from the appointed officers and employees shall in no way 
restrict a free selection of members by the appointive officers and employees of 
the municipality. 
History- C. 1953,10-3-1106, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. y 
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